



briefing

[#05/2]

Policy recommendations for a Canadian response to the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW)

*Small Arms Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee
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The 2001 UN “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA)” remains a watershed document that provides a framework and a follow-up process for national, regional and global action on SALW. Indeed, SALW have remained on the international agenda in no small part because of the PoA. It is consequently imperative that best use be made of the period up to and including the PoA review conference of July 2006, and that civil society and governments alike undertake the necessary preparation and consolidation to ensure the review conference includes the widest possible collection of improvements to the PoA.

Although the scale of human suffering caused by the widespread misuse of SALW requires urgent attention, the range and complexity of the social, economic and political issues that lie behind the devastation underline the need for a considered, comprehensive and multi-faceted response at all community levels, from local to global. Canada has provided leadership in formulating solutions to the complex SALW challenges by encouraging a human security or “people-centred” response and acknowledging that this also requires a wide range of collaborative efforts – efforts that are multilateral,

intra-governmental and based on the cooperation of government and civil society.

The following recommendations from Canadian civil society groups are intended to inform and advance both the immediate implementation of SALW remedial policies and actions as well as Canadian policy preparation for the 2006 PoA UN review. The recommendations reflect the results of research and analysis commissioned by the Small Arms Working Group (SAWG) of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee and funded by the Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI) through the Canadian International Development Agency. The VSI project sponsored a series of research papers which were presented to SAWG representatives and government officials by the authors at a forum held in Ottawa in December 2004.

It is important to note that the VSI-sponsored research did not cover all aspects of the SALW agenda and the recommendations summarized here do not claim to be comprehensive. They are, however, presented in support of a “people-centred” human security approach to SALW and are intended to strengthen the Canadian government’s pursuit of such an approach. The recommendations are compiled under five themes – civilian possession of military SALW, SALW transfers, SALW demand,

important multilateral SALW initiatives and Canadian national policies and actions.

A: Canada should endorse and advance a global ban on civilian possession of military assault weapons.¹

By their nature, military assault weapons are designed to kill humans more effectively, and there is growing international consensus that there can be no legitimate grounds for the use of such weapons by civilians. Many states recognize the risk these weapons pose in civilian hands and have adopted national measures to prohibit or restrict civilian possession. An attempt to introduce a global norm prohibiting civilian possession was made in 2001 through language proposed for the UN PoA on SALW. Although this effort was thwarted at the time, Canada could regenerate multilateral support for a global norm to prohibit civilian possession of military SALW.

Canada should cooperate with like-minded countries and civil society groups to advance a global norm to prohibit civilian possession of military assault weapons:

1. Support a convention, inside or outside the UN system, that calls for a ban on civilian possession of military assault weapons.

Within the UN PoA process, the 2005 Biennial Meeting of States and the 2006 UN Review Conference will be important opportunities to reintroduce language to ban civilian possession of military assault weapons. Canada can look for support to other nations which supported the “L4 version” of the draft PoA in 2001.²

Additionally, a legally binding convention banning civilian possession on military assault weapons should be pursued, relying on like-minded countries to join. While this might gain broad support from UN membership, the absence of participation by the USA would likely be an impediment to its effective pursuit within the UN system. In the absence of international consensus within UN processes, Canada could repeat the example of the Landmines Treaty and focus on

marshalling like-minded states to develop a convention outside the UN system.

a. Ensure the international agreement includes prohibitions on:

- The manufacture of military assault weapons for civilians;
- The import or export of these weapons for civilians;
- The advertising, marketing, or sale of these weapons to civilians; and
- The possession of these weapons by civilians.

b. Support the formulation of a universal definition of military assault weapons.

Definitions of what constitute military weapons vary. A focus on fully automatic military assault weapons would serve little purpose as civilian possession of these is prohibited in most countries already. Ideally, a broad-ranging definition would include fully automatic weapons, selective-fire weapons capable of fully automatic fire, and semi-automatic assault weapons and variants of automatic weapons with certain characteristics such as the ability to accept a large capacity magazine.

c. Support further research and analysis of legislative approaches and definitions used in other countries.

The experience with national legislation suggests creative solutions are needed to ensure that legitimate concerns are addressed without allowing loopholes -- loopholes as simple as name changes -- to render the measures ineffective.

B: Canada should redouble efforts to advance state control of the transfer of SALW according to common international standards.

The national control of SALW transfers, according to common international standards, is essential to combating illicit trafficking and to addressing SALW violence and its human cost. Such transfers must be prohibited unless they are authorized by importing and exporting states and are consistent

with existing state responsibilities under international law. Canada should provide active leadership and support for multilateral initiatives to build stronger controls on transfers of SALW. These initiatives include:

1. A legally binding agreement to prohibit transfers that do not conform to common principles on SALW transfers as set out in the draft Arms Trade Treaty proposed by civil society groups.

The “Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers,” more commonly referred to as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), outlines a set of principles for the control of conventional weapons transfers drawn from state obligations under international humanitarian, human rights and customary law. Originally proposed by a network of civil society groups, the following key principles of the ATT are gaining support from a widening group of governments:

- All international arms transfers shall be authorized by government authority;
- Transfers shall not violate state obligations under international law, such as UN arms embargoes, regional import moratoria, or prohibitions on the transfer of certain weapons;
- Transfers shall not proceed if the arms are likely to be used illegally, such as for breaches of the UN Charter, for serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law, or for genocide or crimes against humanity; and
- In authorizing transfers, states shall take into account other considerations, including the likely use of transferred weapons in violent crimes, as well as their adverse affect on regional security and stability or on sustainable development. In such circumstances, there is a presumption against authorization.

To advance stronger state control of SALW transfers according to common international standards, Canada should support:

a. The insertion of ATT principles into the SALW PoA during the 2006 UN review conference.

The ATT principles have particular relevance for Para 2:11 of the PoA which calls on states to “to assess applications for export authorizations ... consistent with the existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law...” Their insertion in the PoA would be an important step towards a legally-binding global agreement.

b. Measures within the United Nations system to study “the existing responsibility of states under relevant international law” with respect to SALW transfers, such as a study by UN governmental or “qualified” experts.³

Canada should consider sponsoring a resolution of the First Committee at the next UN General Assembly Session mandating a UN Governmental Expert study. The resolution should specify that the composition of the Expert Group include expertise in relevant areas of international law – particularly international humanitarian and human rights law – as well as defence procurement and arms export authorization expertise. Alternatively, and to give consideration to this issue outside the inevitable political considerations of governmental experts, a GA resolution might mandate the UN Secretary-General to consult with a group of “qualified experts.”

c. A common means by which to assess the impact of arms transfers on sustainable development, one important component of which is to engage the department most involved in development issues in export control decisions. In the case of Canada this is the Canadian International Development Agency.⁴

As the result of regional and multilateral arms export-control regimes, many exporter governments, including Canada, have made commitments to account for impacts of arms transfers on the sustainable development of importer countries when making transfer decisions. The 1993 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, the 1998 EU Code of Conduct (to which Canada has

agreed in principle), the 2000 OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the 2002 Wassenaar Arrangement Best Practice Guidelines for Small Arms and Light Weapons all set out the foundations for taking sustainable development into account specifically in arms transfers. In too many cases, however, exporting governments are failing to fully respect the commitments they have made.

To ensure that exporters meet these commitments, Canada should work with other supplier governments to adopt a common means to assess the impact of arms transfers on sustainable development. Recent research suggests the following components for such an assessment methodology:

- Identify arms sales of possible concern using triggers related to the financial value of the transfer and the level of development of the recipient;
- Map the development and human security status of importing countries using indicators that capture economic, social and human development characteristics;
- Consider deeper contextual and deal-specific factors such as importer governance standards, arms-procurement decision-making procedures and the rationale for the import;
- Engage the government departments with expertise on sustainable development. For example, the Department for International Development (DfID) in the UK is involved in arms export assessments where there are concerns about impact on sustainable development. Other supplier nations, including Canada, should follow the UK lead.

2. Support for additional multilateral measures to restrict SALW transfer controls.⁵

These measures include:

- Prohibition of transfers of unmarked SALW. To adequately monitor SALW trade and reduce illicit transfers, an international marking and tracing regime is required. This

should include training and the standardization of electronic data collection to enable sharing of information, under appropriate international governance;

- Consistent and standardized use of end-user certificates;
- No SALW transfers to states where inadequate SALW stockpile management and destruction of surplus weapons stocks may contribute to illicit transfers; and,
- Expansion of the UN Conventional Arms Register to include all classes of SALW.

C: Canada should take further action to reduce the demand for SALW.

A prominent reason for the large numbers of SALW in circulation is the demand for them. Often linked to criminal activity, individual and collective, the vigorous demand for SALW is also due to particular social, economic, and political conditions. Desperation leads many people to think these weapons will be a means to change their situation.

1. Canada should seek the inclusion of language in the PoA that references programmatic measures to deal with the social, political and economic conditions that generate and fuel conflicts and lead to an increased demand for SALW. This could include, but not be limited to:⁶

a. Promotion of good governance to restore citizens' confidence in public institutions in countries where this is lacking.

A primary spur to the acquisition of SALW by individuals and communities is state failure and the loss of public confidence that government can or is willing to attend to their security needs. Currently, the PoA does not include language that highlights the centrality of public institutions in providing a climate of public order and stability. Language that links effective SALW action to effective governance should be inserted.

b. Support for security sector reform and a political environment committed to the pursuit of human security and community safety.

The PoA does refer to police training and strengthening law enforcement capacity, but there is no acknowledgement of the role abusive security forces play in creating demand for SALW. Security sector reform is one of the most frequently noted programmatic responses to the need to reduce demand for SALW. Extensive fieldwork on security sector reform has been undertaken providing lessons learned that can be applied. The PoA should recognize and reflect the prominence of security sector reform.

*c. Support for development and DDR programs that take into account linkages between development and disarmament.*⁷

Reducing availability and misuse of SALW should be viewed as explicit poverty reduction measures. The PoA acknowledges “the implications that poverty and underdevelopment may have for the illicit trade” in SALW, as well as the importance of effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs for peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.

The PoA does not sufficiently address the problem of establishing DDR programs in those countries lacking the economic resources for effective implementation. It should reinforce the importance of mobilizing resources for sustainable development that could be utilized for these purposes. At the same time, funding for DDR programs should not be diverted from other important development programs for conflict-affected countries.

d. Support for references to the roots of SALW demand and for measures that address the basic needs and fears of people based on community participation.

The PoA needs to reference human rights, the social and economic dimensions of crime prevention, and the social and political conditions essential to communal security.

At present, the PoA recognizes that the international community has a role to play in the “pursuit of negotiated solutions to conflicts wherever possible,

including by addressing their root causes...” However, language is also needed that recognizes the valuable role played by local and traditional methods of conflict resolution.

e. Support for cultures of peace.

The PoA acknowledges the importance of tackling cultures of violence, particularly in post-conflict situations, noting especially the importance of awareness-raising and education initiatives. However, little concrete action is proposed. Further support must be provided to civil society groups and community organizers to give substance to the pursuit of cultures of peace, in part through learning about the root causes, triggers, and sustaining factors that generate and perpetuate cultures of violence. There is an urgent need for peace education and conflict management/resolution awareness to be included in school curricula.

*2. Canada should support programs linking conflict resolution and SALW demand reduction.*⁸

Based on “lessons learned” from recent reports and seminars, there are several action directions that would benefit from Canadian support. These include:

a. National and sub-regional collaboration between civil society and government.

Civil society organizations have developed considerable capacity for planning multi-dimensional programs in conflict management, development and SALW control. They could partner more effectively through institutional avenues such as:

- National Focal Points. Many states in the South, including those in Africa that have signed the Nairobi Declaration, have established Focal Points on SALW. If their mandate explicitly included issues related to SALW demand, these could be effective locations for consultation and collaborative planning.

- National programs based on local and district level experience. The growing experience with collaborative conflict management projects at the local and district levels has yet to find its way to national action. These collaborative projects should be documented so that they may inform action at all government levels, and encourage coordinated national programs to resolve conflicts and lessen SALW demand.
- Cooperative links across borders. SALW issues often cross national borders. Multilateral institutional linkages and collaboration in NGO networks offer opportunities for exploring joint work on SALW, conflict and related development issues.

b. More active and effective NGO capacity and collaboration.

SALW and conflict resolution NGOs need forums to build a common language, analysis and action. Manuals and training events to link conflict and development practitioners could be extended to include SALW demand perspectives. Development and implementation of research and evaluation methods are needed to apply to conflict and SALW projects underway or being developed.

c. Attention to programs that will reduce demand for weapons.

Among these programs are:

- Adequately funded and implemented post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration programs. The inadequate reintegration of ex-combatants leads to the re-recruitment of fighters, banditry, destabilization of political and civil life and a pervasive instability that generates demand for weapons.
- Programs that focus on children and youth. Young people form a large part of many southern populations and they are often vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups. They also have been in the forefront of efforts to reduce violence and armed

conflict. The creation and extension of sustainable youth-focused programming requires informed, long-term support by external funders.

- Early reconciliation processes. More external support is needed for trauma-related and other civil society programs that are the necessary preparation of individuals and groups for larger reconciliation processes.
- Peace education programs. It is widely recognized that peace education programs can lead to attitude changes that favour nonviolent conflict resolution. Comprehensive peace education programs should receive funding support as integral parts of DDR, development, arms control and peacebuilding initiatives.

D. Canada should do more to support relevant multilateral initiatives to alleviate the impact of SALW.

1. In its support for regional initiatives Canada should draw upon the lessons of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons.⁹

These suggest the Moratorium would be improved by:

- Encouraging local ownership of weapons collection programs. Ownership of such programs by local communities can reestablish civil authority and empowerment and improve relations with the central government. In Sierra Leone, the role played by the police in community arms reduction programs reestablished the force as a credible law enforcement agency.
- Strengthening, by funding and logistical support, civil society participation in efforts to combat weapons proliferation. Civil society groups have played crucial roles in weapons-for-development programs and the formulation of national firearms legislation. In Sierra Leone, civil society organizations

are represented on the National Committee on Small Arms.

- Supporting improved cooperation between ECOWAS, national governments and civil society organizations.
- Assisting the integration of post-conflict programs, from transitional justice to weapons collection, to minimize misunderstanding and misinterpretation. Robust public awareness programs could explain the multiple tracks in the peacebuilding process.
- Promoting arms supplier respect for regional SALW moratoria. The end of the superpower standoff led to massive downsizing of armies, particularly in the former Soviet Union and apartheid South Africa, and large quantities of weapons were made surplus when central and eastern European countries discarded Soviet-made weapons to adopt NATO-style weapons in preparation for joining that organization. Canada could do more to prevent surplus SALW from circumventing the ECOWAS moratorium by bringing political pressure on current and prospective NATO members to tighten SALW export controls.

*2. Canada should support international steps towards the mutually-supporting goals of reducing the flow of small arms and preventing the involvement of children in armed conflict.*¹⁰

The preamble of the 2001 UN PoA recognizes the negative impact of armed conflict on children and Section II:22 of the PoA calls on states “to address the special needs of children affected by armed conflict.” A review of the literature on SALW misuse and the impact of war on children, moreover, reveals important considerations for the development of effective remedial strategies based on the common ground between them. Norms for protecting children are among the most universal and most local, providing a strong ethical and legal base for action while the current body of international law provides a strong basis for linking arms control policies to the mandate to protect the security and rights of children.

Canada can support steps to address both problems by:

- Urging the UN Security Council to:
 - implement SC Resolutions 1460 and 1539 which call for specific actions to protect children and to control the illicit trade in SALW;
 - use UN monitoring missions to interdict the flow of SALW to groups involved in serious violations of the rights of children;
 - protect populations vulnerable to SALW violence, especially in refugee and IDP camps; and
 - engage in dialogue with belligerent parties using SALW in violations of the security of children.
- Cooperation with the UN Security Council in investigations of the supply of SALW to armed groups involved in serious violations of the security of children (in keeping with SC Resolutions 1460 and 1539); and
- Encouraging coordination of National Action Plans for Children and the National Focal Points of the PoA. In a best case scenario, a national plan for children will include specific goals related to SALW and the work plan for the Focal Point will include youth participation.

E. Canada should adopt national policies and procedures to strengthen control of, and action on, SALW. These should include:

*1. A review of arms transfer authorization procedures with a view to ensuring they are in conformity with international legal obligations.*¹¹

Canada should put in place effective regulations and procedures to ensure that international legal obligations with respect to arms transfers are being met. These include:

- a policy requiring export control officials and the Minister to act in accordance with all relevant international obligations;
- export criteria against which individual applications are assessed that specifically relate to these international obligations; and
- involvement in the export assessment process of individuals with the requisite international legal expertise.

2. Responsibility for Canada's export control system should be returned to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Responsibility for the export of Canadian military goods was transferred from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of International Trade in December 2003 by a government order-in-council. Yet, arms exports are fundamentally foreign policy transactions that have implications for the national security of recipient countries, for security and stability at the regional level, and for human rights, humanitarian law, development and disarmament – all issues that are responsibility of Foreign Affairs Canada. The Trade Minister, whose mandate is to expand Canadian exports, is not the most briefed on the conditions for export control. To best meet Canada's international legal commitments, and in particular its obligations to control SALW exports, responsibility for arms export decisions should return to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

3. National policies to regulate the activities of arms brokers.

There is growing evidence of the need for more effective national regulation of arms brokering, that is, those activities by individuals and companies designed to facilitate an arms deal, such as arranging financing or transport, or bringing the buyer and seller together. Canada should demonstrate leadership on this issue by enacting legislation on arms brokering that includes registration of brokers, licensing of brokering activities and appropriate penalties for all illicit brokering activities.

4. Greater transparency in Canada's annual report on the export of military goods to facilitate public assessment of compliance with international law.

The SALW category of Canada's annual report is not equivalent to SALW as defined by the United Nations. SALW are reported in a number of categories in the report and as a result, it is impossible to assemble a complete picture of Canadian SALW exports. For example, ammunition for large and small calibre weapons is grouped into one category and the report detail is insufficient to determine what portion is intended for SALW use. Similarly, the category containing bombs, rockets and missiles does not identify those that would be considered light weapons. To remedy this situation, the annual report should provide transfer data on a clearly-defined, distinct group of SALW, including those that are exported as part of larger weapon systems.

5. Measures, in cooperation with civil society, to improve corporate responsibility in the international SALW trade.¹²

The Canadian government and non-governmental organizations have an important role to play in addressing Canadian corporate responsibility in the international SALW trade. The government could look to nascent normative developments in corporate responsibilities under international law such as the 2003 *United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights*. Telling the story that explains how particular corporations contribute to the availability and oversupply of SALW in zones of conflict and how the public could take action to hold corporations accountable also would be a step towards more effective state control of the arms trade. The responsibilities of private actors in SALW trade could be addressed by such means as:

- a public awareness campaign to link domestic sales of particular corporations with their international SALW trade practice. Research on subsidiaries, relationships in the supply chain and the

dynamics of the globalized marketplace would provide an assessment of which companies would be most vulnerable to market pressure. International human rights norms could be used as a source for crafting key political messages to educate the public;

- a public/private partnership similar to the “Kimberley Process” used to restrict conflict diamond trading. The partnership would expressly target arms brokering and financial transfers; and
- litigation, such as charges of crimes against humanity in domestic courts, could be used as a short-term means to hold corporations responsible for egregious actions.

6. Ratification of relevant international agreements, in particular CIFTA within the OAS system and the Firearms Protocol of the UN.

Canada should expedite the ratification of two international SALW control agreements that for too long have awaited full Canadian participation. The Organization of American States’ “Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA),” signed by Canada in 1997, is evidence of the hemispheric consensus on the need to tackle illicit SALW activity and was an important regional predecessor to the 2001 UN PoA. The United Nations “Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol),” intended to improve global cooperation in dealing with illegal firearms manufacture and trade, was signed by Canada in March 2002. Canada has been slow to ratify both treaties, and the delay has reduced Canadian credibility on SALW controls. This situation should be remedied without further delay.

7. Opportunities for further collaboration between the Canadian government and civil society on SALW policy development and programs.

Since many aspects of the SALW crisis need to be addressed at the community level, the involvement of civil society in SALW policies and action is

imperative. We encourage the Canadian government to continue to explore SALW policy with Canadian NGOs, to remain open to ongoing sharing of information and analysis, and to draw on the expertise and experience of Canadian civil society with regard to SALW concerns. It also is important to note that civil society groups and individuals in countries of the South are often at the forefront of SALW response and Canada must continue to find the ways and means to encourage and support their crucial activities.

Notes

¹ The recommendations of section A are taken from “The Feasibility of Increased Restrictions on the Civilian Possession of Military Assault Weapons at the Global Level,” a research report for the Small Arms Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee prepared by Wendy Cukier, March 2005.

² The L4 Rev 1 version of the draft UN PoA 2001, made explicit reference to the need for nations to regulate civilian possession and use: “To put in place adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the legal manufacture, stockpiling, transfer **and possession** of small arms and light weapons within their areas of jurisdiction. To ensure that those engaged in illegal manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and possession can and will be prosecuted under appropriate penal codes. To seriously consider the **prohibition of unrestricted trade and private ownership of small arms and light weapons specifically designed for military purposes**” [emphasis added].

³ The recommendation of section B:1(b) is taken from “International Legal Prohibitions on Conventional Arms Transfers,” prepared for the International Security Research and Outreach Programme, International Security Bureau, Foreign Affairs Canada by Peggy Mason, July 2003.

⁴ The recommendations of section B:1(c) are taken from “Guns or Growth? Assessing the impact of arms sales on sustainable development,” prepared for the “Control Arms” campaign sponsored by Oxfam International, Amnesty International and the International Action Network on Small Arms. The

report was published in June 2004 in association with Project Ploughshares and Saferworld.

⁵ The recommendations of section B:1(d) are taken from “Small Arms, Children and Armed Conflict: A Framework for Effective Action,” prepared for the Small Arms Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee by Kathy Vandergrift and David Lochhead, August 2004.

⁶ The recommendations of section C:1 are taken from “Reducing the Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons: Priorities for the International Community,” by Ernie Regehr, Project Ploughshares Working Paper 04-2, July 2004.

⁷ A 2003 UK DfID conference on poverty and armed violence also offers useful recommendations including: Reducing availability and misuse of SALW should be viewed as explicit poverty reduction measures; guidelines on small arms control and reduction would assist development professionals; the OECD Development Assistance Committee should become more engaged in SALW issues; development programs need to be assessed for impacts on small arms availability and misuse; and the terminology “combating SALW proliferation and misuse” should be changed to “preventing and reducing armed violence.”

⁸ The recommendations of section C:2 are taken from “Conflict Resolution and Lessening the Demand for Small Arms,” prepared by David Jackman for the Quaker United Nations Office. The paper is a summary report of a research seminar organized by QUNO and the Africa Peace Forum held in Nairobi, April 20-22, 2004.

⁹ The recommendations of section D:1 are taken from “Implementing the ECOWAS Small Arms

Moratorium in Post-War Sierra Leone,” prepared for the Small Arms Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee by Alhaji Bah, May 2004 (available at <http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/WORKING%20PAPERS/WPlist.html>).

¹⁰ The recommendations of section D:2 are taken from “Small Arms, Children and Armed Conflict: A Framework for Effective Action,” prepared for the Small Arms Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee by Kathy Vandergrift and David Lochhead, August 2004.

¹¹ The recommendations of section E:1 are taken from “International Legal Prohibitions on Conventional Arms Transfers,” prepared by Peggy Mason, July 2003.

¹² The recommendations of section E:5 are taken from “Small Arms and Corporate Social Responsibility: Emerging International Norms and a Program for Advocacy,” prepared for the Small Arms Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee by Tracy London, February 2005 (available at <http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/WORKING%20PAPERS/WPlist.html>).

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Project Ploughshares is an ecumenical agency of the Canadian Council of Churches that works with churches and related organizations, as well as governments and non-governmental organizations, in Canada and abroad, to identify, develop, and advance approaches that build peace and prevent war, and promote the peaceful resolution of political conflict.
“and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they learn war any more” (Isaiah 2:4)