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Background paper

Peacebuilding: A broad review of approaches, policies and practices

Dr. Nicolas Lemay-Hébert and Sophie Toupin

Introduction

The term peacebuilding was first introduced through UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s report to the Security Council, Agenda for Peace, in 1992. Since then, peacebuilding has been included in the policies of donors, multilateral and regional organizations. Emergency and developmental non-governmental organizations have also come to play an important part in peacebuilding activities. This issue paper, commissioned by the non-governmental organization Peacebuild, aims to provide a concise review of certain peacebuilding policies and practices. This will be done by looking at the ways in which a variety of international actors have conceived the concept of peacebuilding and how civil society, mostly a few international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have contributed to its expansion.

Readers ought to bear in mind that this draft issue paper was produced under a tight timeline (three weeks) and primarily for the purpose of stimulating discussion during a consultation in Ottawa on March 14, 2011. It does not pretend to present an exhaustive review of all approaches, debates and peacebuilding strategies. Neither does it pretend to defend a thesis or a particular argumentative line. We have sought to provide an overview of some peacebuilding strategies

and main debates (how to include local ownership in specific peacebuilding strategies, how to promote integrative strategies between donor countries, how to increase interactions between international and local actors, etc.) and elicit a discussion with practitioners over what peacebuilding means for them. The main conclusions of the debate will be summarized in a workshop report.

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Challenges from the rise of intra-state violence

There is a wide consensus among political analysts and practitioners concerning the importance of the state collapse phenomenon in contemporary world politics. A number of important issues are considered under the rubric of state collapse, including international terrorism; transnational crime; ethnic conflict; and human security threats such as HIV/AIDS or ecological degradation. Indeed, in light of the growing number of intra-state conflicts, the central cause of war in the present international system stems from weak and failed states.¹ According to the latest issue of the *SIPRI Yearbook*, state weakness is among the most critical factors stimulating armed violence.² Close to a billion people are living in dysfunctional states according to Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, rendered powerless by a “sovereignty gap” – the disjunction between the de jure assumption that all states are sovereign regardless of their performance in practice.³ Except for some specific authors,⁴ reconstruction of the state is believed to be necessary, as is external assistance for the collapsed state in a transitional period. William Zartman, states “it is necessary to provide a large, informally representative forum, and if the contenders for power do not do so, an external force to guarantee security and free expression during the legitimization process may be required... In all three areas – power, participation, and resources – it is hard to get around the usefulness,

¹ See: Kalevi Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xi. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars* (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), 5.

² Ekaterina Stepanova, “Armed Conflict, Crime and Criminal Violence” in *SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

³ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart. *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 21.

⁴ See for instance the scholars defending the theory of the “fresh start.” Andreas Mehler and Claude Ribaux state that “the collapse of states in crisis need not be prevented, since a ‘better state’ cannot emerge until that collapse has taken place.” For Samuel Eisenstadt, “collapse, far from being an anomaly, both in the real world and in social evolutionary theory, presents in dramatic form not the end of social institutions, but almost always the beginning of new ones.” Finally, Timothy Raeymaekers argues that “we should start thinking hard about the possibility that state collapse presents a plausible, and perhaps even likely, outcome for some states in the system.” Andreas Mehler and Claude Ribaux, *Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in Technical Cooperation: An Overview of the National and International Debate* (Wiesbaden: Universum Verlanganstalt / Deutsche Gesselschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2000), 107; Samuel Eisenstadt, “Beyond Collapse,” in *The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations*, ed. Norman Yoffee and George Cowgill (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), 243; Timothy Raeymaekers, “Collapse or Order? Questioning State Collapse in Africa?” Conflict Research Group, Working Paper no. 1, May 2005, 7. See also: Martin Doornbos, “State Collapse and Fresh Starts: Some Critical Reflections,” in *State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction*, ed. Jennifer Milliken, 45-62. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003; Nicholas van Hear, “Re-Casting Societies in Conflict,” Center on Migration, Policy and Society, Oxford University, Working Paper no. 22, 2005; and the proponents of the laissez-faire approach: Edward Luttwak, “Give War a Chance” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (July-August 1999): 36-44; and Jeffrey Herbst, “Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice” in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, edited by Robert Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

if not the outright need, of external assistance.”⁵ However, the exact nature of this external assistance is still widely debated.

Peacebuilding: Between state collapse and state-building

The general ambition of peacebuilding is “to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”⁶ It connotes activities that go beyond crisis intervention, such as longer-term development, and building of governance structures and institutions. In that regard, it is a concept integral to the more general concept of state-building (and state collapse). For Zartman, state collapse refers to “situations where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new... As the authoritative political institution, (the collapsed state) has lost its legitimacy, which is therefore up for grabs, and so has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs.”⁷ More often than not, the state collapse process entails political violence and a mix of intra- and inter-state conflict. Hence, peacebuilding aims “to address the sources of current hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution. Stronger state institutions, broader political participation, land reform, a deepening of civil society, and respect for ethnic identities are all seen as ways to improve the prospects for peaceful governance.”⁸ However, peacebuilding has become a broadly used but often ill-defined term connoting activities that go beyond crisis intervention such as longer-term development, and building of governance structures and institutions, to the extent that Roland Paris states that nowadays “there is no universally accepted definition of peacebuilding” while Charles-Philippe David considers that there are “as many visions of peacebuilding as there are experts on the issue and actors on the field.”⁹

The rise of the “integrated paradigm”

The viability of the concept of peacebuilding resides in its integration of a strategic approach and the inclusive notion of peace attached to it. When peacebuilding is not seen as “transformative”, but simply as a stop-gap measure, there is a strong probability of seeing a relapse into conflict in the following years, following the scaling down of the international involvement. This is consistent with the data collected by Roy Licklider and Paul Collier among others, showing that about a quarter of all peace agreements fail in the first five years after they have been signed and

⁵ William Zartman, “Putting Things Back Together” in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, ed. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 270-272. The three areas the author refers to are 1) reconstructing central power (the powerful must be recognized as legitimate, or the legitimate must be made powerful); 2) increasing state legitimacy through participation; and 3) raising and allocating economic resources in support of peace.

⁶ United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, UN. Doc. A/47/277 and S/24/111, 17 June 1992, para. 46.

⁷ William Zartman, “Introduction: Posing the problem of state collapse” in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, ed. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 1-5.

⁸ Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” *American Political Science Review* 94, no 4 (December 2000), 779.

⁹ Roland Paris, “Broadening the Study of Peace Operations,” *International Studies Review* 2, no. 3 (Fall 2000), 33 (footnote 18); Charles-Philippe David, “Does Peacebuilding Build Peace?” *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 1 (March 1999), 27.

nearly 50 per cent fail within ten years. This led to the necessity to adopt integrated strategies for peacebuilding.¹⁰ In light of the increased complexity of post-conflict environments, which includes the growing awareness of the state collapse phenomenon in the 1990s, there have been significant calls to react to these exigencies with coherent multilateral responses. The 2004 *Utstein* Study of peacebuilding analyzed more than 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the previous decade and identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what the authors termed a “strategic deficit,” as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding. The *Utstein* study found also that more than 55 per cent of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy.¹¹ The integrated mission concept was designed to address this shortcoming.

The United Nations’ “New Architecture of Peace”

The United Nations began to tackle the theoretical issue of “rebuilding wartorn societies” in 1992-1993, which coincides loosely with the collapse of both Somalia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) convened its first research-preparatory workshop on this theme in April 1993 and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) developed a program on “Linking Rehabilitation to Development: Management Revitalization of Wartorn Societies” around the same time.¹² The creation in 1992 of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN under the leadership of Boutros Boutros-Ghali also opened new perspectives for the development of peacebuilding operations. If the UN sometimes experimented with peace missions that entailed peacebuilding activities in the Congo (1960-1964), Cyprus (since 1964) and Lebanon (since 1978), most peace missions during the Cold War involved traditional activities of supervision of ceasefire agreements or interposition between warring countries’ forces. With the growing role played by the Security Council after 1988,¹³ no less than 14 new peace missions saw the light in a four-year period, compared to the 13 stood up between 1948 and 1988. Quickly enough, the UN found itself embroiled in complex environments without coherent strategies, which subsequently led to “crises of expectations” in the mid- to late-90s.¹⁴ The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, otherwise known as the Brahimi Report, underlined the necessity to reinforce the peacebuilding structures inside the UN, while providing the institution with a clear doctrine. Without institutional changes, the UN will not be capable of “executing the critical

¹⁰ Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-93,” *American Political Science Review* 89, No 3 (September 1995): 681-690; Paul Collier et al, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil Wars and Development Policy* (Washington: World Bank & Oxford University Press, 2003).

¹¹ Dan Smith, “Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together,” overview report of the *Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding*, Evaluation Report 1/2004, Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, 10. The Utstein Project was established by the development ministers of the UK, the Netherlands, Norway and Germany in 1999, with the aim of improving the implementation of their peacebuilding strategies.

¹² Martin Doornbos, “State Formation and Collapse; Reflections on Identity and Power,” in *Pivot Politics: Changing Cultural Identities in Early State Formation Processes*, ed. Martin van Bakel, Renée Hagesteijn and Pieter van de Velde (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1994), note 1, 281.

¹³ The reactivation of the Security Council predates the fall of the Berlin Wall and followed Mikhail Gorbachev’s elaboration of a new international policy.

¹⁴ Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thaker, *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign it in coming months and years.”¹⁵

To meet these challenges, the UN also tried to promote integrative policies. The UN Report on Integrated Missions defines an integrated mission as “an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or to address similarly complex situations that require a system-wide UN response, through subsuming different actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework.”¹⁶ In other words, an integrated mission requires the UN to develop an overarching strategic vision of each peace operation and to gather all the appropriate tools available across the UN system to achieve those goals.¹⁷ An integrated mission is defined as one in which there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objective of the UN presence at country level.¹⁸ In his report on UN reform, *In Larger Freedom*, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan recognized that there was a “gaping hole” in the UN’s institutional machinery in this area: “...No part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace.”¹⁹

The UN Peacebuilding Commission was created in 2005 in order to tackle this issue, notably to “...advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery [and] to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development.”²⁰ Thus, according to the new UN doctrine, the creation of the new “peacebuilding architecture”²¹ reflects “a growing recognition within the international community of the linkages between UN peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding roles. When a country comes before it, the Peacebuilding Commission helps marshal the resources at the disposal of the international community and advise and propose integrated strategies for peacebuilding and recovery.”²² In so doing, the Peacebuilding Commission can help gather the resources and provide comprehensive strategies to support countries which are not international hotspots. Since its birth, the Peacebuilding Commission has focused on the cases of Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and, more recently, Liberia and Guinea.

¹⁵ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on Peace Operations*, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, Section 1.

¹⁶ Espen Barth Eide et al. “Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations,” Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, May 2005, 3.

¹⁷ Emily Munro, “Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges,” GCSP Geneva Paper 1, May 2008, 10.

¹⁸ United Nations, *Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)*, 13 June 2006, 2.

¹⁹ United Nations, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, UN Doc A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, para. 114.

²⁰ United Nations, *The Peacebuilding Commission*, UN Doc. A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645, 30 December 2005, para 2(a).

²¹ This architecture comprises the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), a 31-Member State subsidiary advisory body of both the General Assembly and the Security Council; the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), a multi-year standing trust fund for post-conflict peacebuilding and; the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), which is the part of the Secretariat that services the PBC, manages the PBF, and supports UN system peacebuilding efforts.

²² United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 20.

A 2008 report by the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and the International Peace Institute flagged a number of shortfalls, notably inadequate coordination with international financial institutions and other UN agencies and departments (among them the Security Council), while noting a modest number of positive results achieved by the Commission.²³ The review of the UN peacebuilding architecture adopted a critical tone, hoping that the report would serve as a “wake-up call” to the international community, “helping to strengthen the collective resolve to deal with peacebuilding in a more comprehensive and determined way.”²⁴

DFID: Fragile or poor states?

For the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), fragile states “have governments that cannot or will not deliver its basic functions to the majority of its people, including the poor.”²⁵ Using the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments as a way to estimate the level of fragility, DFID divides low-income countries into five categories of performance, the lowest two of which are “useful proxies for state fragility.” There is a separate group of unranked countries, also deemed fragile. This provides a list of 46 fragile states, containing 870 million people or 14 per cent of the world’s population. Middle-income countries are not included in this list.²⁶ This analysis is reinforced by a number of scholarly contributions. According to Maria Ottaway and Stefan Mair, “there is hardly a low-income country that does not face the possibility of failure,”²⁷ while for Stuart Eizenstat, John Porter and Jeremy Weinstein, “of the world’s more than 70 low-income nations, about 50 of them are weak in a way that threatens US and international security.”²⁸

This analysis brings to light a number of practical issues. In this context, the expression “failed or failing state” seems to be a convenient neologism describing nothing more than a state with low-standards of living, a country that has not attained the same level of development – measured as the public goods provision of state institutions – as the “developed world”. As Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta state,

“...Many comparative and classificatory analyses of states, such as those that rank states as ‘weak’ or ‘strong,’ effectively strip the unit of analysis – the state – from its cultural moorings... Such exercises take for granted that ‘fully developed’ and ‘ideal’ states are Western liberal democratic ones. Western states are thus often

²³ NYU Center on International Cooperation and International Peace Institute, *Taking Stock, Looking Forward: A Strategic Review of the Peacebuilding Commission*, April 2008.

²⁴ United Nations, *Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture*, UN Doc. A/64/868 and S/2010/393, 21 July 2010.

²⁵ DFID, “Fragile States,” http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.dfid.gov.uk/fightingpoverty/fragile_states.asp (last accessed 18 February 2011).

²⁶ DFID, *Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States* (London: Department for International Development, January 2005), 7.

²⁷ Maria Ottaway and Stefan Mair, *States at Risk and Failed States: Putting Security First*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004, 2.

²⁸ Stuart Eizenstat, John Porter and Jeremy Weinstein, “Rebuilding Weak States,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (January-February 2005), 136.

employed as the norm against which other states are judged; the criteria for ‘strong’ state are almost always those that apply to a specific subset of Western nation-states.”²⁹

Hence, while attempting to forecast state failure (see annex for various indicators of state failure or fragility), the poverty-focused approach adopted by some of the DFID reports leaves aside potential political crises arising in middle-income countries. The recent turmoil in the Middle East is a good example at hand. At the same time, it can leave the impression of specifically targeting certain regions of the world for their poor distribution of public goods, while not taking into account alternatives to centralized state institutions. For instance, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has noted that 80 per cent of worldwide justice development assistance goes to the formal justice sector, while traditional and customary systems resolve around 90 per cent of conflicts.³⁰

OECD: Bringing legitimacy into the picture

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicates that “states are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations.”³¹ However, the OECD, maybe more than any other international organization, incorporates legitimacy aspects in its analysis. In one of its reports, it states that “in practical and political terms, international actors have tended to focus either on capacity or will, perhaps reflecting the instruments available to them. Relatively few incorporate questions of legitimacy in any operational sense. Each of these, however – capacity, will, legitimacy – is critical to a more accurate and dynamic understanding of fragility and its causes.”³² As the report notes, the goal is to shift thinking “from a focus on transferring institutional models, towards a focus on the local political processes, which create public institutions and generate their legitimacy in the eyes of a state’s population.”³³

As identified by the authors of the report, the implications for policy-making are numerous. First, the need for proper country assessments that take note of informal and non-state service provision as well as those of the state. Integrated or joint assessments should be prioritized, in order to avoid counter-productive strategies between countries. Second, when a legitimate settlement is emerging, forge joint, multi-donor strategy with the government, and then provide direct support to the state budget without undue interference as to the prioritization or allocation of that support.

²⁹ Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, “Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in an Age of Globalization,” in *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*, ed. Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 10-11.

³⁰ UNDP, “Access to Justice,” Practice Note, 9 March 2004, 8-9.

³¹ OECD, *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*, April 2007, para. 3. See also: OECD, *Service Delivery in Fragile Situations: Key Concepts, Findings and Lessons*, OECD/DAC Discussion Paper, 2008, 7.

³² OECD, *Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience*, OECD/DAC Discussion Paper, 2008, 16.

³³ OECD, *Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience*, OECD/DAC Discussion Paper, 2008, 3.

This is a huge point of contention, since many states are blocked from doing so by legislation while most donors don't trust the capacity of governments to manage the funds and want credit for their projects. Nevertheless, it is a debate that should be addressed according to the authors. Following certain conditions (establishment of reinforcement of sound management systems, clear sequencing, so on), Ghani and Lockhart favour national programs over other types of implementation (humanitarian programs, quick-impact projects, development projects or sector approaches).³⁴ Where the state lacks the basic will to negotiate a resilient social contract, there should be political engagement with the government to seek to generate the necessary political reforms and support to service delivery functions of the state, if viable, or alternative mechanisms of service delivery to meet human needs where not. Third, policy on semi-authoritarian states should identify opportunities for engagement with state institutions where that engagement may have only minimal impact on state legitimacy. Peacebuilding or statebuilding should seek to avoid extending regime survival, while at the same time reducing the likelihood of a rapid political transition that could trigger chaotic state collapse.

Norway: Sustainability and local ownership in peacebuilding

In 2004, Norway released its strategic framework on peacebuilding, which laid out three main goals: security, economic and social development, and political development. From 2004 on, Norway has recognized peacebuilding as one of the main priorities for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Multilateral peacebuilding approaches are favoured by Norway. Its 2008-2009 white paper states, "In fragile states, [Norway] mainly works through and in close cooperation with the UN system, the World Bank and NATO, and with regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)".³⁵ Norway considers that the use of multilateral channels or civil society is a way to help vulnerable groups when government-to-government assistance as an instrument of peacebuilding is difficult to opt for due to poor governance, weak institutions and policies.³⁶

The notions of sustainability through a common multilateral approach and the principle of local ownership that are promoted by Norway, raise a question.³⁷ To what extent does the use of a multilateral approach risks creating parallel structures that will further undermine ownership?

The lack of common understanding of what the UN peacebuilding architecture entails and how it should be used has been, until now, a major factor contributing to the incoherence and relatively poor record of sustainability of peacebuilding efforts by donor countries.³⁸ Although supporting sustainability of effort was one of the main objectives of the peacebuilding architecture when the mechanisms were established at its origin, the 2009 UN Secretary General's report on

³⁴ Ghani and Lockhart, 198.

³⁵ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian development policy adapting to change, Report No. 13 (2008-2009) to the Storting, Climate, Conflict and Capital, 2008-2009, 63.

³⁶ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Strategic Framework, Peacebuilding – a Development Perspective, 2004, 35.

³⁷ *Ibid.* p. 5.

³⁸ Cedric de Coning, Clarity, Coherence and Context : Three Priorities for sustainable Peacebuilding, Working Paper : The future of the Peacebuilding Architecture Project, CIPS-NUPI, 2010, 14.

peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict has, according to Erin McCandless, submerged the principle of sustainability. By refocusing priorities within the two first years following a conflict, the peacebuilding architecture will be less able to support efforts to ensure medium- to long-term sustainability.³⁹

The World Bank's State and Peace-Building Fund

The World Bank has identified fragile states and conflict-affected countries as one of its six strategic themes for achieving inclusive and sustainable globalization. In April 2008, the bank created a trust fund, the State and Peace-Building Fund (SPF), to catalyze its work. The new fund replaced the Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) and the Low Income Countries Under Stress Trust Fund (LICUS TF) which have been operational since 1998 and 2004, respectively. The two main goals of the fund are to support measures to improve governance and institutional performance and support the reconstruction and development of countries prone to, in, or emerging from conflict. The Board of Directors committed to the provision of US\$100 million from the bank's own administrative budget for the period 2009-2011, and the fund received contributions from the governments of the Netherlands and Norway.

This development follows the increasing role played by Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) in post-conflict environments. The PCF can be used to support a wider range of partners, including national governments, UN agencies, international NGOs, transitional authorities and local civil society. It is generally used to support early recovery activities. The MDTFs are more traditional instruments for improving resource efficiency and effectiveness by reducing transaction costs, and, in particular, by mitigating high risks inherent in post-crisis environments. The UN or the World Bank is best suited to administer such funds due to their ability and capacity to work in such high-risk environments. UN administered MDTFs have typically more rapid disbursement arrangements and more flexible procedures, while World Bank administered MDTFs are more effective at using developing country systems and supporting long-term development initiatives.⁴⁰ It may be desirable to sequence a UN and a World Bank MDTF. A UN MDTF could be used for quick impact projects, to, in part, demonstrate a peace dividend. The World Bank MDTF, which may take much longer to establish, could be developed in parallel to support longer-term development goals.⁴¹

An African policy framework

The African Union (AU) has been increasingly involved in peacebuilding in the past few years. In collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities (RECS), it has developed a Peace and Security Architecture (AUA), much like the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa. A key feature of the AU's engagement in peacebuilding is its Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework which rests on five key principles: African

³⁹ Erin McCandless, *In pursuit of Peacebuilding for Perpetual Peace*, CIPS-NUPI, 2010, 18

⁴⁰ Scanteam/Norway, *Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, Final Report*, February 2007, para. 8.

⁴¹ DFID, *Working Effectively in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Situations: Briefing Paper G – Act Fast... But Stay Engaged*, DFID Practice Paper, March 2010, 7-8.

leadership; national and local ownership; inclusiveness; equity and non-discrimination; cooperation and coherence; and capacity building for sustainability.⁴²

While being concerned with local ownership, the AU is itself partly a subject of local ownership from an international standpoint. Local ownership can be understood as a process where the solutions to a particular society's needs are developed in concert with the people who are going to live with, and uphold, these solutions in the long run.⁴³ African solutions to African problems is one of the core principles of the AU peace and security architecture. However, this architecture is also fraught with difficulties (lack of resources, weak structures, etc.) and challenges among its member states.

At the international level there is recognition that the role sub-regional organizations play in maintaining peace and security is desirable, feasible and necessary.⁴⁴ However, despite the UN vision of a mutually-reinforcing global-regional mechanism⁴⁵ for peace and security, challenges remain to transform words into actions. Improvised, politically-selective and resource-skewed approaches to regionalism are impediments to the global-regional approach.⁴⁶

The AU has developed a peace and security architecture, but questions remain. Will the AU be able to carry out its intended goals? And how will it be able to operationalize its work? How will it partner with the UN and other actors from civil society to increase coordination and effectiveness?

Civil society as a key peacebuilding actor

There is wide consensus regarding the centrality of civil society to conflict resolution. The primacy given to the construction of civil society as a keystone for building peace was laid out in the Agenda for Peace. Commonly, civil society refers to a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power.⁴⁷ From this definition, it is understood that in a broad conceptual sense, civil society goes beyond NGOs and formally constituted organizations.

Since the 1990s, international non-governmental organizations have taken on more and more leadership responsibilities in peacebuilding efforts.

⁴² African Union, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)*, (African Union Commission. 2007), 6.

⁴³ Annika Hansen and Sharon Wiharta, "The Transition to a Just Order – Establishing Local Ownership After Conflict, A Policy Report," Research report, Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2007, x.

⁴⁴ Kwesi Aning, *Africa Union's Peace and Security Architecture : Defining an Emerging Response Mechanism*. (Uppsala : The Nordic African Institute, 2008), 2

⁴⁵ Secretary General report, *A regional-global security partnership: challenges and opportunities*, A/61/204-S/2006/590

⁴⁶ Kwesi Aning, *Africa Union's Peace and Security Architecture : Defining an Emerging Response Mechanism*. (Uppsala : The Nordic African Institute, 2008),

⁴⁷ Béatrice Pouligny, *Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building New Societies*, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 36, no.4, December 2005, 497.

The contributions of INGOs to peacebuilding activities have come to complement those of donor states, international and regional organizations and, therefore, become essential to conflict responses and in strengthening peacebuilding processes. This is evident in the growing engagement of INGOs with state actors, notably through bilateral governmental aid being channelled through them. INGOs have also been seen as essential partners of the UN in mobilizing public opinion, in the process of deliberation, policy formulation and in the execution of policies.⁴⁸ Coordination and cooperation among INGOs and with other peacebuilding players has been a challenge due to scarcity of resources, lack of time, divergent ideologies, etc.

In international relations, INGOs are viewed as vehicles of democratization and of local civil society capacity-building⁴⁹. On the ground, they often aim to empower and increase the capacity of local civil society actors, often through providing indispensable services and/or opportunities no longer provided by a weak or failed state. They are also involved, to a lesser degree, with heightening individual and collective capacities of state's institutions. Because of their relative independence, legitimacy and the broad scope of their work, they have been able to create relationships of trust with local civil society (local NGOs, elites, youth, women's groups, etc.) and often been central to communicating local concerns in national and international forums.

However, some INGOs have been criticized by local civil society for following the agendas of their home country, especially in the peacebuilding sphere, rather than maintaining impartial status.⁵⁰ INGOs have also been seen as promoting the principles of liberal peace and have come to be equated by some publics and donors with civil society in the South, thus reducing the space and the possibilities for indigenous peacebuilding organizations and networks to flourish.⁵¹

UN Police as early peacebuilders

In post-conflict situations, the rule of law, security and justice infrastructures have been destroyed or gravely compromised. Rebuilding these institutions has become an important part of most UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates. For example, the Peacebuilding Commission has prioritized, in a mutual commitment with the Government of Liberia, security sector reform and the rule of law.⁵² This focus will be critical in the transfer of security management from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the Government of Liberia.

UN Police (UNPOL), through the expertise acquired in their home countries, address specific needs as well as help build and develop basic police functions. The concept of United Nations civilian police was first introduced in the Congo mission in 1960-1964, arguably the first

⁴⁸ Kaldor, Mary *New and Old wars organized violence in a Global Era*, Stanford University Press, and California 1999.

⁴⁹ Civil society has usually been seen as a force for peace rather than a harbinger for radicalisation or of an instrument of the state.

⁵⁰ Mari Fitzduff, *The Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict*, An integrated programme of research, discussion and network building -*Issue paper on Civil Society and Peacebuilding – the New Fifth Estate, Issue paper*, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 2005.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p.8

⁵² Peacebuilding Commission, Fourth Session, Organizational Committee,(PCB/4/OC/L.1), 26 January 2011

multidimensional and integrated peace mission. However, it only became a significant element of peace missions at the end of the 1980s.⁵³ UNPOL mandates at that time were summarized by the SMART concept; that is Supporting, Monitoring, Advising, Reporting and Training.⁵⁴

Contributing countries are responsible for the proper selection and training of UNPOL officers prior to deployment. Once in mission, officers normally receive two-weeks of training tailored to the mission in which they will be operating. However, police contributing countries do not always have the necessary resources and capacity to carefully select or provide adequate training prior to deployment.

INGOs such as the Pearson Peacekeeping Center (PPC), work in partnership with many African and Latin American countries to build their institutional capacity to select, deploy and train UNPOL officers that will in turn serve to reform and professionalize the local police. One of the PPC flagship areas of expertise is to improve the capacity of female UNPOL officers to provide assistance to victims of gender-based violence and help the local police better investigate gender-based crimes of violence. The PPC has also worked with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to support their campaign to increase the number of female UNPOL officers to 20 per cent by 2014 and thus fulfill the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820.

Communications and peacebuilding

Having access to information and improving communication in post-conflict settings are vital for building a culture of peace. A culture of peace refers to a set of “values, attitudes, and behaviours that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing on basic principles,” that foster social justice and non-violence.⁵⁵ Community and social media, and particularly radio, have the power to play a crucial role in peacebuilding contexts in fostering a culture of peace. Community media centres have helped assist local populations to harness the power of media to counteract divisions, quell rumours, give a voice to the voiceless, encourage people to think of peaceful solutions and to deal with problems in a creative and non-violent fashion.

A range of INGOs have been involved in this type of programming, notably through delivering journalism training (Journalists for Human Rights), radio networks (World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters), community outreach programs that builds local capacity (International Women’s Tribune Center), among others. INGOs have also used blogs, wikis and other forms of social and alternative media to communicate information about conflict issues and to hear voices rarely heard in the mainstreamed media.

In partnership with women’s groups in Uganda, Liberia, Kenya, and elsewhere, the International Women’s Tribune Center (IWTC) has produced a series of radio programs called Women Talk Peace that aim to raise awareness about United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which

⁵³ Annika Hansen, *From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁵⁴ The SMART concept was first introduced in a DPKO booklet entitled “A Trainers Guide on Human Rights for CIVPOL Monitors,” according to police expert Robert Perito from the United States Institute for Peace.

⁵⁵ General Assembly, Culture of Peace, A/RES/52/13, 15 January 1998.

specifically addresses the impact of war on women and women's contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace. Through the production of these radio programs that are developed hand in hand with women's groups, IWCT aims at empowering women, at enabling their ability to redefine development paradigms, at fostering women's participation in the public policy arena and building democratic societies.

Along with citizen journalists, Ushahidi was developed to map reports of violence in Kenya following the election in 2008. Ushahidi, "testimony" in Swahili, was created as a way to challenge the traditional ways that information flows. Thanks to citizen journalists in times of crisis (Kenya and Haiti), incidents of violence and peace efforts have been mapped on an Internet platform. These maps were based on reports submitted via web and mobile phones. INGOs and UN peacekeepers are known to have used Ushahidi mapping in Haiti to locate and assist people in distress.

Such initiatives build on the crucial role civil society plays in communications for peacebuilding efforts.

Women as peacebuilders

Involving women and taking a gender perspective on peacebuilding activities have been recognized as essential for democratic inclusiveness, sustained economic growth and human and social capital recovery.⁵⁶ In fact, some researchers and practitioners believe that peacebuilding "may well offer the single greatest opportunity to redress gender inequities and injustices of the past while, setting new precedents for the future"⁵⁷.

In 2009, when the Security Council adopted UN SCR 1889, it asked the Secretary General to produce a report on women's participation in peacebuilding. The report highlighted that women are crucial partners in shoring up the three pillars of lasting peace: economic recovery, social cohesion and political legitimacy.⁵⁸ The report also highlighted some of the challenges to women's participation in public and political life, such as lack of economic opportunities, gender stereotypes, threats to their physical safety, lower educational attainment and the lack of time on their hands because of unequal division of domestic responsibilities. However, it has also been recognized that women's opportunities can be enhanced or constrained by the international community in ways in which it establishes its priorities and uses its resources for peacebuilding. Channelling money into women's and gender issues in post-conflict countries is crucial. This was emphasized by Michelle Bachelet in a recent speech as one of the three most important priorities of UN Women.⁵⁹ In 2010, UNIFEM conducted a review of gender equality funding gap. The study found that in six post-conflict countries only 5.7 per cent of funding was directed

⁵⁶ Jeniffer Klot, *Women in Peacebuilding*. Report Commissioned by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) 2007, 2.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Secretary-General Report on Women's participation in peacebuilding (A/65/354 - S/2010/466), 7 September 2010.

⁵⁹ Michelle Bachelet, Speech, *Phyllis Kossoff Annual Lecture, Hunter College*, New York, March 3, 2011, <http://www.unwomen.org/2011/03/women-war-and-peace/>

towards advancing gender equality.⁶⁰

Projects that aim at developing the capacity of local women peacemakers or networks of men dedicated to developing healthy masculinities and/or combatting sexual and gender-based violence can be an effective means of ensuring that women and men participate in and benefit from post-conflict programming.⁶¹ The Global Network of Women's Peacebuilders (GNWP) is a good example of an organization that has prioritized the work of women in peacebuilding. GNWP aims at bridging the gap between policy discussions (Security Council), implementation (governments) and action (women's groups) on the ground with regards to women, peace and security issues. They have particularly been successful in connecting grassroots peacebuilders to national and international actors, particularly the friends of the women, peace and security agenda chaired by the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations and developing the capacity of women as peacebuilders.

Conclusion

Since Boutros-Ghali announced his Agenda for Peace in 1992, the concept of peacebuilding has been broadly used, revealed its complexity and demonstrated its worth in contributing to short-term humanitarian goals and long-term development goals. Moreover, in the past years, a greater number of actors at the international, regional and local level have been engaged and involved in a variety of peacebuilding efforts. The complexities of tasks at hand, the varying approaches and the numerous actors involved in the process have shown the importance of and the challenges associated with coherence and collaboration among actors. The Peacebuilding Commission which was under review in the summer of 2010, may help in addressing present challenges and in generating a larger consensus on peacebuilding. The increasing recognition that the successes of peacebuilding efforts require local ownership is a key issue. External actors -- international organizations, donors and NGOs -- can, after all, only facilitate and support peacebuilding.

⁶⁰ Finnoff, Kade, and Ramamurthy, Bhargavi, *Financing for Gender Equality: Review of United Nations Modalities for Post-Conflict Financing* (UNIFEM, 2010)

⁶¹ Secretary-General Report on Women's participation in peacebuilding (A/65/354 - S/2010/466), 7 September 2010, p. 12.

Annexe 1: Listing Failed, Fragile and Weak States						
Countries	World Bank: “Fragile States”	US Foreign Assistance Framework: “Rebuilding Countries”	State Fragility Index: “Red States”	Fund for Peace Failed States index: “Alert States”	Brookings Index of State Weakness: “Failed and Critically Weak States”.	DFID: “Fragile States”
Afghanistan	X	X	X	X	X	X
Angola	X		X	X	X	X
Azerbaijan						X
Bangladesh				X		
Burma	X		X	X	X	X
Burundi	X		X	X	X	X
Cambodia	X					X
Cameroon						X
Central African Rep.	X			X	X	X
Chad			X	X	X	X
Colombia		X				
Comoros	X					X
Congo Dem Rep.	X	X	X	X	X	X
Congo, Rep. of	X		X	X	X	X
Ivory Coast	X	X	X	X	X	X
Djibouti						X
Dominica Rep.						X
Equatorial Guinea					X	
Eritrea	X				X	X
Ethiopia			X	X	X	X
Gambia						X
Georgia						X
Guinea	X		X	X	X	X
Guinea Bissau	X		X		X	X
Guyana						X
Haiti	X	X		X	X	X
Indonesia						X
Iraq		X	X	X	X	
Kenya				X		X
Kiribati						X

Kosovo	X	X				
Laos	X					X
Lebanon		X		X		
Liberia	X	X	X	X	X	X
Malawi				X		
Mali						X
Nepal		X	X	X	X	X
Niger			X	X	X	X
Nigeria	X		X	X	X	X
North Korea				X	X	
Pakistan				X		
Papua New Guinea						X
Rwanda			X		X	
Sao Tome & Principe						X
Sierra Leone		X	X	X	X	X
Solomon Islands	X			X		X
Somalia	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sri Lanka				X		
Sudan	X	X	X	X	X	X
Tajikistan						X
Timor Leste	X			X		X
Togo	X				X	X
Tonga						X
Uganda			X	X	X	
Uzbekistan				X		X
Vanuatu	X					X
West Bank and Gaza	X					
Yemen				X		X
Zambia			X			
Zimbabwe	X		X	X	X	X

Table adapted from Liana Wyler, *Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and US Policy*, Congressional Research Service Report for the US Congress, August 28 2008.

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